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ireless communication between vehicles —
often termed vehicular ad hoc networking
(VANET) — is assumed to contribute to a
safer, more efficient, and more comfort-
able driving experience in the foreseeable future. One use
case that appears in many research efforts is the dissemination
of status information in a certain region, e.g., 5 km, surround-
ing the vehicles. An example is the co-operative detection of
traffic jams achieved by vehicles exchanging information about
their current position and speed. In a very simple implementa-
tion, each vehicle could periodically broadcast such messages
using multi-hop flooding. 
Scalability Through Aggregation
The major drawback of this periodic flooding approach is that
it does not scale well. Consider a simplified example of a traf-
fic jam on a three-lane highway with 20 m distance between
vehicles. That means a total of 750 vehicles on a 5 km high-
way segment. Assuming a theoretic transmission range of 200
meters and a message generation rate of 1/sec, every vehicle
on these 5 km is expected to receive 3 u 2 u 200m/20m u 750 =
45,000 packets per second. If each packet is 100 bytes in
length (including all headers), this consumes a total of 36
Mb/s, not considering MAC delays, bandwidth demands of
other applications, and broadcast collisions due to the multi-
hop dissemination. Overall, the application will over-saturate
the communication medium and cannot be implemented that
way.
Several approaches have been proposed to mitigate this
problem, including transmit power control, dynamic reduction
of transmission frequency, and efficient Geocast protocols.
For applications like traffic jam detection, another suitable
solution is in-network data aggregation.
The idea of aggregation is simple: instead of disseminating
individual messages, vehicles compare messages that they
receive with their own information base, semantically combin-
ing messages where possible. Thus, after collaborative detec-
tion of a traffic jam in this way, only one message suffices to
convey the information about an arbitrarily long traffic jam.
Compared to the dissemination of several hundreds of mes-
sages from all vehicles in the traffic jam, this is a huge band-
width saving. 
Security is an Unresolved Problem
Several examples [1, 2] discuss the benefits and scalability of
such aggregation schemes and propose solutions specifically
tailored to the needs of VANETs. However, introducing
aggregation also opens new opportunities for attackers to dis-
rupt normal operation. In the above-mentioned example, an
attacker could misuse the aggregation scheme to report a con-
gestion on the next 10 km of the road, claiming that he
received reports from hundreds of vehicles that contributed to
the aggregate value.
As we will discuss later, vehicular networks pose strict
requirements on security and existing approaches cannot be
easily applied. We then introduce a generic aggregation
model that serves as a basis for further considerations. We
present two security mechanisms that can detect attacks and
mitigate their effects. We evaluate the protection level and
the performance that these mechanisms can achieve. We
then conclude with a summary and outlook on our ongoing
work. 
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Abstract
Innovative ways to use ad hoc networking between vehicles are an active research
topic and numerous proposals have been made for applications that make use of it.
Due to the bandwidth-limited wireless communication medium, scalability is one cru-
cial factor for the success of these future protocols. Data aggregation is one solution
to accomplish such scalability. The goal of aggregation is to semantically combine
information and only disseminate this combined information in larger regions. How-
ever, the integrity of aggregated information cannot be easily verified anymore.
Thus, attacks are possible resulting in lower user acceptance of applications using
aggregation or, even worse, in accidents due to false information crafted by a mali-
cious user. Therefore, it is necessary to design novel mechanisms to protect aggrega-
tion techniques. However, high vehicle mobility, as well as tight bandwidth
constraints, pose strong requirements on the efficiency of such mechanisms. We pre-
sent new security mechanisms for semantic data aggregation that are suitable for use
in vehicular ad hoc networks. Resilience against both malicious users of the system
and wrong information due to faulty sensors are taken into consideration. The pre-
sented mechanisms are evaluated with respect to their bandwidth overhead and their
effectiveness against possible attacks.
Resilient Secure Aggregation for
Vehicular Networks
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Security Issues
Difficulties for the security of aggregation arise directly from
the advantage of aggregation: messages carry information with
higher semantic value and less redundancy than reports from
a single vehicle. While atomic reports only claim a single fact
(e.g., one vehicle’s speed), aggregates contain the combined
view of many vehicles in a larger area. Therefore, the process
of aggregation and dissemination should be protected against
malicious attacks, which we discuss in the following. 
Adversary Model and Goals
We consider an adversary to be a single entity which may con-
trol several stations in a certain area of the network. The
attacker stations can actively participate in the communication,
that is, they can send and receive any message conforming to
the aggregation protocol. Focusing only on the aggregation
process, we can identify the attacks depicted in Fig. 1: 
• Forging of atomic reports. An attacker station may forge its
own speed and thus influence further aggregation (node 5).
As a result, aggregates may be biased.
• Forging of aggregates. Instead of just influencing aggregates,
an attacker may directly create aggregates with arbitrary
data and inject them into the network (node 8).
• Suppression of aggregates. Because of the larger information
value of aggregates, attacker stations may suppress aggre-
gates, resulting in biased information dissemination (node 9).
While suppression of aggregates and forging of atomic
reports certainly influence aggregation, the most effective
attack on aggregation is the creation of entirely fictitious aggre-
gates, because such aggregates can pretend to carry information
about arbitrary dimensions and values. For example, one single
aggregate may claim a congestion in a very large area, causing
all other vehicles to avoid that area. Therefore, the major goal
for secure aggregation is to safeguard the aggregation process
in order to prevent attackers from forging aggregates.
Constraints
Due to the specific characteristics of vehicular networks, pro-
tecting aggregation is not trivial. High mobility causes fre-
quent topology changes, that is, nodes constantly encounter
new neighbors and leave others behind. Therefore, security
mechanisms should not assume stable structures such as a
static node topology. These high dynamics together with the
bandwidth limited wireless channel constrain the usage of
interactive solutions. Multi-round protocols that involve the
exchange of multiple messages to convince neighbors that an
aggregate was correctly merged may fail, because mutual
reachability may be very short. Therefore, re-use of existing
protocols for wireless sensor networks [3] is not possible.
Secure aggregation without multi-round communication
has, for example, been considered by Picconi et al. [4]. The
proposed system uses random checks similar to interactive
attestation in WSNs. However, a tamper-proof service in each
vehicle acts as a proxy for the receiver. Thus, multi-round
communication over the wireless channel is avoided. An
aggregator passes each aggregate to be disseminated to this
service, which requests a randomly chosen original record to
prove its integrity. Only if the original record is valid, it will be
added to the newly created aggregate record as a proof item
for other vehicles. This method allows to achieve a probabilis-
tic verification of aggregates without a large communication
overhead. The main disadvantage of this approach is the
dependency on the tamper-proof service. An attacker can eas-
ily bypass this service and compose malicious aggregates
including a valid proof item.
Node reputation management is also not a viable solution
to safeguard self-organized networks [5]. To build node repu-
tation for semantic aggregation in particular, each aggregate
would need to be accompanied by a list of all participating
nodes’ identities. However, this list would lead to exponential-
ly increasing aggregate sizes, thereby destroying the band-
width savings of aggregation. Even if such a list was available,
derivation of reputation for individual nodes would be diffi-
cult because it is hard to determine which one of the contribu-
tors maliciously modified the aggregate at an earlier stage of
the aggregation process.
Another approach for secure aggregation is presented by
Raya et al. [6]. Here, streets are divided in segments of static
size corresponding to the coverage of wifi signals. However,
this grouping approach implies an underlying aggregation
scheme employing a fixed segmentation of the road. It has
been shown [7] that this type of aggregation cannot scale well
with a large number of vehicles and larger areas, for example,
long traffic jams spanning over several kilometers.
Further, it is assumed that all group members share the
same view of their environment, which is calculated in a group
agreement process. Securing data aggregation is then achieved
by hybrid signatures to achieve a trade-off between computa-
tion efficiency and bandwidth efficiency. The assumption that
group members agree on one common view of their environ-
ment means that either a multi-round scheme is employed,
which is infeasible due to high node mobility. Or, a quantiza-
tion is applied, for example, speed might be reported only
with 10 km/h granularity. However, this would unnecessarily
reduce the information value of the aggregates. Further, the
assumption that all vehicles in a segment drive at a roughly
common speed could be wrong considering different vehicle
types, e.g., fast cars and trucks.
We will therefore introduce a security mechanism that does
neither rely on agreeing to common views nor node reputa-
tion and also works with dynamic road partitioning. For this,
we will further develop the idea of probabilistic attestation,
removing the need for a tamper-proof device in each car.
Generic Aggregation Model
Before discussing our proposed security mechanisms, we will
now introduce a generic model for the underlying aggregation
that is applicable to a wide range of applications like traffic
information systems, icy road warning, counting of parking
spots, fog warnings, and so forth. For this, we consider the fol-
lowing generic aggregate structure: 
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Figure 1. Schematic overview of different attacks influencing
aggregation. Node 5 forges atomic reports, node 8 assembles
entirely forged aggregates, and node 9 drops aggregates 
selectively.
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The index dimensions indicate the area, and possibly time,
about which an aggregate contains information. The values
are the actual information contained, e.g., average speed, min-
imum temperature, number of parking lots, or range of vision.
The meta-information items contain all additional informa-
tion used to verify the aggregate’s correctness according to our
security mechanisms. The same notation can be used to
express signed atomic reports by setting ai = bi and m1 to be
the signature over the aggregate’s content. Whenever atomic
reports are combined to a new aggregate — or when existing
aggregates are further combined due to hierarchical aggrega-
tion mechanisms — an aggregation function calculates the new
values of the resulting aggregate, e.g., the new speed average
based on the speed values contained in the existing aggregates
and atomic reports. Moreover, the index dimension intervals
are adjusted to reflect the new area in time and space that the
resulting aggregate holds information about. That is, if two
aggregates Av and Avv are combined to the new aggregate A,
then a1 = min(av1, avv1), b1 = max(bv1, bvv1), and so forth.
In the rest of this article, we will consider the case of two
index dimensions. One defining the interval of a road, the
other defining the time interval that an aggregate contains
information about. As an exemplary value we will use the
average speed driven by vehicles in that area. However, the
mechanisms presented can be applied to many other aggrega-
tion applications. 
Security Mechanisms
On top of the generic aggregation mechanism, we design a
security mechanism adhering to the constraints discussed ear-
lier. The basic system model is shown in Fig. 2. We assume
that information originating from both local sensors as well as
other vehicles enters a vehicle’s local information base where
it is stored, possibly further processed, and finally disseminat-
ed to other vehicles in the vicinity. Information originating
from local sensors is considered to be trustworthy whereas
remote information needs to be further assessed to assign a
certain trust in its validity. For this assessment, we employ a
combination of selective proofs using cryptographically signed
atomic reports and probabilistic verification of the informa-
tion contained in a given aggregate. This methodology results
in a data-centric trust [8] in contrast to a node-centric trust as
it would result from a node reputation system.
As soon as a trust value has been assigned to an aggregate,
it is further processed locally using only this trust value as
basis for decisions by the underlying aggregation mechanism.
We call this scope the local trust domain of a vehicle. Howev-
er, as we do not employ a node reputation system, the trust
domain does not extend beyond vehicle borders. Therefore, as
soon as aggregates are selected for dissemination to nearby
vehicles, the assigned trust value looses its significance and
will not be communicated. Receiving vehicles will again judge
the aggregates according to the security mechanisms. 
Selective Attestation
A common technique to secure vehicular communication,
especially beaconing applications, is to cryptographically sign
each outgoing message, thereby giving a proof of the sending
vehicle’s identity, given that the accompanying public key is
signed by a central, mutually trusted authority. Such a PKI
system is commonly agreed to authenticate messages in vehic-
ular networks [9]. If an adversary then sends out beacons with
a high frequency to give his information a higher weight,
other vehicles can easily detect the high frequency due to the
attached signature and discard attacker messages. However,
when using aggregation, atomic reports of several vehicles will
be combined to aggregates. Even if all atomic reports were
cryptographically signed initially, the signature cannot be veri-
fied after aggregation because the information that was signed
has been altered and one cannot reproduce the single speed
reports given only the resulting speed average. Thus, deter-
ministic verifiability is lost.
To achieve a certain verifiability of the aggregates nonethe-
less, we need to attach a certain amount of meta-information
to aggregates, which serves as a witness for the correctness of
the aggregation. This meta-information will be called attesta-
tion meta-data. A simple approach to select such witnesses
would be to add all cryptographically signed atomic reports
that served as input to the aggregation as attestation meta-
data. In that case, any receiver could deterministically verify
the aggregation by first checking all signatures of the atomic
reports and then re-calculating the speed average and verify-
ing that the result is the same as the one contained in the
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Figure 2. Overview of the system model showing the flow of aggregates and atomic reports through
our system.
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Figure 3. An example aggregate A with attestation meta-data
attached. The attestation meta-data is comprised of three border
atomic reports {R1, …, R3} and the additional reports {R4, …,
R6} selected according to the granularity defined by the security
parameter S.
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aggregate values. However, if all atomic reports are attached
to aggregates as attestation meta-data, there will be no reduc-
tion of bandwidth usage.
Therefore, we select a strategically chosen subset of all atom-
ic reports that served as input to an aggregate to allow for a
probabilistic verification. To stipulate the detection of mali-
cious information with as few meta-data as possible, we
employ a list of criteria to select the meta-data during the
aggregation process.
First, we can uniquely identify those atomic reports that led
to an aggregate’s current maximum and minimum in time and
space (e.g., {R1, … R3} for A in Fig. 3). Considering that
aggregates will commonly represent an area whose vehicles
share common values, e.g., common speed, all such atomic
reports defining the borders of an aggregate’s area will be
added as attestation meta-data. Only if a vehicle is able to
present valid signed information about all borders of an
aggregate, it can be believed to be valid.
Especially if aggregates cover larger areas (as it is the case
for A in Fig. 3), adding values from the borders will only lead
to a first indication that an aggregate is valid. An adversary
can still select arbitrary atomic reports and craft an aggregate
where the claimed values are only present at the borders and
not throughout the area. This could, for example, lead to the
concealment of a traffic jam. Therefore, additional meta-data
is needed. The goal is to select each additional signed atomic
report such that they are evenly distributed throughout the
aggregate ({R4, …, R6} in Fig. 3). The finer the granularity of
the distribution, the higher the achieved security. To express
this granularity, we introduce a security parameter S that
defines the required granularity of the additional reports,
marked by the dashed lines in Fig. 3. However, reports are
not available at arbitrary positions. They can differ from the
ideal positions defined by S, e.g., R6 differs by an amount of
66. Thus, checking the distribution of additional reports is not
a binary process. Instead, the conformance to the ideal distri-
bution can be characterized by considering all deviations 6i.
To select additional reports during the aggregation process,
we proceed inductively. Assume that two aggregates, A1 and
A2, which already contain additional signed reports according
to S, are selected to be combined. The area covered by A1 and
A2 in time and space can either already overlap, or they can
be disjunct. If they overlap, their contained additional reports
suffice to achieve a good distribution throughout the aggre-
gate. In the overlap region, only those additional reports are
kept that are nearest to the optimal grid. If A1 and A2 do not
overlap, their distance in time or space can be either smaller
than S or larger. If it is smaller, all additional reports of A1
and A2 together will still approximate the ideal grid well.
However, if the distance is larger than S, then there are
regions for which no supporting reports can be found. The
same considerations apply for the aggregation bootstrapping.
When two signed atomic reports are first selected for aggrega-
tion and their distance is smaller than S, then the resulting
aggregate will adhere to the criteria defined above. Otherwise,
it will not. In all cases, we can find the necessary additional
reports if aggregates or atomic reports selected for combina-
tion are not further apart than S.
Thus, S needs to be selected such that it matches the
underlying aggregation mechanism. If, for example, two
reports will be aggregated when their distance is less than 1
km, then S needs to be at least 1 km. Smaller values for S will
result in honest nodes not being able to adhere to the ideal
grid for additional report selection. Larger values of S are
possible, resulting in a lower probability of detecting attacks
but also in a lower bandwidth overhead. Considering these
criteria, an adversary can craft malicious aggregates in two
ways. First, he can omit additional attestation meta-data that
would otherwise expose the attack. This would lead to an
uneven distribution of attestation meta-data which can be
detected. Second, an attacker can adhere to the distribution
rules. Then, the values contained in the signed reports would
make the forgery attempt obvious.
In summary, we have defined two strategies for the selec-
tion of signed atomic reports serving as witnesses attesting the
correctness of aggregates:
• Atomic reports from the aggregate borders are always
attached due to their exposed position. As the goal of
aggregation is to combine reports from regions with similar
characteristics, those values serve as clues for trust in aggre-
gates.
• Further, additional signed atomic reports that are evenly
distributed throughout the area of the aggregate are select-
ed to underline the correctness of the values. The band-
width/security trade-off can be adjusted according to
application requirements due to a configurable security
parameter.
Trust Fusion
As argued earlier, deterministic and cryptographically verifi-
able proofs of an aggregate’s integrity are hard to achieve in
the context of vehicular ad hoc networks. However, the pre-
sented selective attestation mechanism results in clues leading
to trust in the correctness of an aggregate, namely:
• BORDERS. All borders of an aggregate are supported by a
signed atomic report.
• DISTRIBUTION. Additional signed reports are distributed
evenly throughout the aggregate, adhering to the security
parameter S.
• VALUE_APPROXIMATION. All values contained in the
signed atomic reports presented as attestation meta-data
support the claimed values of the aggregate.
Figure 4. Methodology of the fuzzy reasoning employed for trust fusion. The membership functions (MSFs) deter-
mine how input values map to adjectives. The same value can be mapped to multiple adjectives with different
degrees.
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In addition to the clues given by the selective attestation
process, there can be a number of further clues that are
defined by specific aggregation applications. One example is
VALUE_RANGE, i.e., the presented values are within their
natural range.
Due to the number of possible clues and their correlations
with each other, their interpretation can be complex. There-
fore, we employ a reasoning mechanism, namely fuzzy reason-
ing [10], to combine all collected clues to a single value that
expresses the trust in the correctness of an aggregate in per-
cent. The basic methodology is shown in Fig. 4. First, each of
the clues needs to be expressed as a floating point number.
For example, the above mentioned VALUE_APPROXIMA-
TION can be expressed by the root mean square error of all
atomic reports’ values v1, …, vn and the claimed value v of the
aggregate:
Similarly, the distribution of additional signed reports can be
expressed as a floating point value by merging all deviations 6i
from the ideal grid defined by S. Then, a set of adjectives is
assigned to each of the clues. Those adjectives characterize
the floating point value of their corresponding clue using nat-
ural language. An exemplary set of adjectives for the clue
VALUE_APPROXIMATION is {perfect, good, fair, poor}.
Note, that the adjectives do not need to correspond to crisp
intervals of the floating point value of a clue but can gradually
fade in and out (Fig. 4). Next, if-then-statements can be used
to reason about the correlation of several clues, e.g.:
if DISTRIBUTION is good and
VALUE_APPROXIMATION is (perfect or good) then
TRUST is high
It is possible to formulate as many of these rules as necessary
for a given application. As shown in the example rule, the
TRUST property is assigned adjectives in the same way as all
the clues. Also, the resulting trust value (in the range of 0–100
percent) is mapped to the adjectives low, medium, and high.
Thus, only a mapping between the input values’ adjectives and
the corresponding trust adjectives needs to be expressed by
the rules without the need to explicitly express exact correla-
tions between the underlying floating point values. The result-
ing trust percentage is then calculated by evaluating the rules,
considering, for example, which trust adjective has been
assigned to the most. Then, all further components of the
underlying aggregation mechanism can use this single trust
value to judge the correctness of the aggregate, e.g.:
• If the trust value is very low, the aggregate can be discarded.
• Fusion of aggregates with highly differing trust values can
be prevented.
• Aggregates with high trust value can be preferred for fur-
ther dissemination.
However, as soon as an aggregate is selected for further dis-
semination, the assigned trust value looses its significance.
Any vehicle receiving the aggregate will re-evaluate the trust
using the attestation meta-data.
The combination of the presented selective attestation
mechanism with the trust fusion allows to combine crypto-
graphic signatures used as trust anchors with probabilistic
integrity criteria. Although arbitrarily complex correlations of
those criteria can be expressed, due to the fusion to only a
single trust value, only minor modifications to the underlying
aggregation scheme are necessary to make use of the added
security mechanisms.
Evaluation
For evaluation, we simulate an aggregation scheme to detect
traffic jams [1], corresponding attacks, and our proposed securi-
ty mechanisms using the JiST/SWANS simulation framework.
The simulation model uses two-ray ground path loss and an
IEEE 802.11-based MAC. A total of 30 nodes, among which 10
are attackers, move on a 1,500 m-long highway segment with
three lanes. After 900 m, the highway is blocked by an obstacle,
resulting in a developing traffic jam. The size of dissemination
messages is fixed. Aggregated information and attestation
atomic reports are added according to the rules specified earli-
er. For this example application, we chose the security parame-
ter S = 333 m, i.e., 3 attestations per kilometer are required in
addition to the atomic reports at the borders of an aggregate,
corresponding to the settings of the underlying aggregation
mechanism. For the temporal dimension, we do not apply S in
the simulation, because outdated reports are already ignored by
the aggregation mechanism. To assess the effectiveness of the
proposed mechanisms, both the achieved security and the
induced bandwidth consumption are evaluated. 
Achieved Security
The mean aggregated view of the situation, without an active
adversary, is shown in Fig. 5 (no attack). The simulated adver-
saries now try to conceal the congestion by crafting aggregates
that pretend normal traffic flow on the whole road. Without
any security countermeasures, the attackers can alter the
aggregated view of the situation on average by 25 km/h (con-
cealment attack). Moreover, under attack, the aggregated
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Figure 5. Averaged traffic flow in three different situations: the
actual situation with no attack, a congestion concealment
attack, and the same attack with selective attestation security.
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Figure 6. Comparison of dissemination speed between the underly-
ing aggregation mechanism without security mechanisms, the
selective attestation mechanism, and the dissemination of signed
atomic reports without aggregation. 
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views of the vehicles differ notably, shown by a high standard
deviation in the graph. With activated security mechanisms,
the resulting mean aggregated view is close to the reference
view without attack. An attacker trying to conceal the conges-
tion is not able to present enough supporting information.
This results in a lower trust in attacker aggregates leading to a
correct representation of the real situation. 
Performance 
Despite the security gain, one important factor of secure
aggregation mechanisms is their scalability. To gauge this per-
formance, we use the dissemination speed as a metric, that is,
the amount of time needed until all vehicles have information
about a high percentage of the upcoming road. This metric
implicitly includes the bandwidth overhead due to security
mechanisms, because the dissemination packet size is fixed.
Thus, information dissemination is slower if fewer aggregates
fit in one packet. The simulation parameters are selected
equal to the security evaluation setting. We compare the
selective attestation with the performance of the underlying
aggregation mechanism without any security considerations
and against the periodic dissemination of cryptographically
signed atomic reports without any aggregation. Figure 6 shows
that the aggregation without security countermeasures outper-
forms both security aware protocols, as expected. The beacon-
ing of atomic reports without aggregation achieves a certain
awareness of the vehicles’ neighborhood at first but then only
increases linearly as the vehicles explore more of the simulat-
ed road by driving along. The selective attestation approach
significantly outperforms the dissemination of atomic reports.
Although the dissemination speed is slower than the insecure
aggregation due to the size of added signatures, at the end of
the simulation, over 90 percent of the road is known, whereas
the atomic report beaconing only reaches about 70 percent.
It should be noted, that the bandwidth overhead induced by
the selective attestation correlates only with the area that is
covered by aggregates and is independent of the amount of
vehicles in a certain area. Especially in scenarios with very
high vehicle density, e.g., traffic jams, the selective attestation
therefore clearly outperforms the dissemination of atomic
signed reports. Moreover, the computational overhead for the
verification of signatures is decreased notably, since only a
small amount of atomic reports are transferred, compared to
the approach that does not aggregate, i.e., that sends all infor-
mation as signed atomic reports.
Conclusion
In this article, we have motivated the need for using aggrega-
tion in VANETs and highlighted arising security issues that
are clearly unique and different compared to those that arise
in other VANET scenarios.
We present selective attestation and trust fusion, two mech-
anisms that add and use a certain amount of additional atom-
ic (i.e., non-aggregated) data attached to a message to
evaluate the trustworthiness of the aggregate. In our evalua-
tion, we show that these mechanisms are both efficient and
effective. As we explain earlier, compared to earlier work on
secure aggregation, our mechanisms fit better to the specific
requirements of VANETs that mostly arise from the high net-
work dynamics.
As our mechanisms are based on a generic aggregation
model, they can easily be integrated in most existing aggrega-
tion schemes and will add significant additional robustness
against attacks. In our future work, we plan to implement more
complex scenarios and attacker models that will allow us a
more detailed analysis of selective attestation and trust fusion.
Another interesting aspect is the relation of aggregation
and privacy. As aggregation is removing individual person-
related data from the aggregates, it can be per-se considered
as a privacy enhancing technology. It is our goal to develop
the secure attestation to a point where it can be performed
without revealing details about the individuals or vehicles
involved to bridge the gap between security and privacy.
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